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Feature-Based Memory-Driven Attentional Capture: Visual Working
Memory Content Affects Visual Attention
Christian N. L. Olivers, Frank Meijer, and Jan Theeuwes
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
In 7 experiments, the authors explored whether visual attention (the ability to select relevant visual
information) and visual working memory (the ability to retain relevant visual information) share the same
content representations. The presence of singleton distractors interfered more strongly with a visual
search task when it was accompanied by an additional memory task. Singleton distractors interfered even
more when they were identical or related to the object held in memory, but only when it was difficult to
verbalize the memory content. Furthermore, this content-specific interaction occurred for features that
were relevant to the memory task but not for irrelevant features of the same object or for once-
remembered objects that could be forgotten. Finally, memory-related distractors attracted more eye
movements but did not result in longer fixations. The results demonstrate memory-driven attentional
capture on the basis of content-specific representations.
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Visual attention is the mechanism by which humans select
relevant and ignore irrelevant visual information for a task. Visual
working memory is the mechanism by which humans actively
retain relevant and prevent interference from irrelevant visual
information for a task. This large overlap in definition, together
with a large overlap in brain areas involved in attention and
working memory (see, e.g., LaBar, Gitelman, Parrish, & Mesulam,
1999), has prompted the hypothesis that the two concepts may
reflect one and the same general function, working on the same
type of content. Simply put, both visual attention and visual
working memory processes selectively activate and prioritize par-
ticular visual representations above others; it is just that in the case
of working memory, this occurs in the absence of the actual
stimulus.
One of the models in which the identity relationship between
attention and working memory1 is made most explicit is the biased
competition model of Desimone and Duncan (1995). According to
this model, when the observer’s task is to select a specific target
object from a future stimulus display consisting of multiple com-
peting objects, then, in anticipation of the display’s appearance, a
representation of the target will be preactivated—activity that
reflects the content of working memory. Once the actual display
appears, the target object will have a direct advantage in the
competition for selective attention, because its features have al-
ready been activated through the memory representation. In the
extreme case, such a scheme would predict automatic attentional
capture, contingent on the mnemonic content: If visually remem-
bering an item unavoidably involves activating its perceptual fea-
tures, then this should give an automatic advantage to outside
world objects carrying those features. The present study was
designed to test this prediction of content-based memory-driven
attentional capture.
Memory-Driven Attentional Capture
There are now a substantial number of studies pointing toward
a content-based relationship between memory and attention. How-
ever, so far, none of them have provided conclusive evidence, as
alternative explanations have been available.
If one regards imaging as a form of visual working memory use,
then content-specific interactions between memory and attention
can be traced back to Farah’s seminal studies on imagery (with
related ideas going back as far as Pillsbury, 1908). For instance,
Farah (1985) instructed participants to imagine either a T or an H,
after which she faintly presented one of these letters in a two-
alternative forced-choice detection task. The letters were better
detected when they matched the mental image, a result that implies
a common representational structure between perception and im-
agery. In a follow-up study, Farah (1989) presented participants
with a grid of empty squares and asked them to imagine the
1 Note that even though we may sometimes omit the adjective visual, the
discussion is meant to be restricted to visual attention and visual working
memory, because in our experiments stimuli were presented only to the
visual modality (as has been the case in most studies on the relationship
between attention and memory). Nevertheless, the same principles may
apply to other modalities.
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presence of either a T or an H on this grid by “mentally filling in”
the corresponding squares. After they had formed the mental
picture, the participants were required to detect a probe dot pre-
sented in one of the grid’s squares. Farah found a greater bias (but
not greater sensitivity) toward detecting probe dots for the area
“occupied” by the imaged letter. Following Neisser (1976), she
interpreted this bias as an “attentional readiness” to perceive the
imaged letter. Farah’s findings resonate with a more recent study
by Downing (2000), who found that probe stimuli were faster
detected when presented on a background picture that matched the
picture observers had to remember in an accompanying memory
task, relative to an unrelated control picture. However, although
both Farah’s and Downing’s studies suggest an interaction be-
tween working memory and attention, neither provides a strong
test for the automaticity of this interaction. This is because attend-
ing to the matching stimulus was never really detrimental to the
task—on the contrary, observers may have deliberately chosen to
attend more to an object when instructed to imagine or remember
that same object, because they thought it might help them.
A more stringent test of memory-driven attentional capture was
provided by Downing and Dodds (2004). They asked participants
to remember one shape and then search for another shape in a
visible display. The to-be-remembered shape could return as a
distractor in the visual search display. Because when present it
would always be a distractor, paying attention to the memorized
item would have been detrimental to the task, and observers should
therefore have had no incentive to do so. An increased distractor
interference effect would therefore have been a strong indicator of
automatic memory-driven attentional capture. However, despite an
admirable number of attempts, Downing and Dodds (2004) failed
to find such an increased distractor effect and concluded that the
to-be-remembered item and the to-be-attended item can be rela-
tively shielded from each other. Recently, Woodman and Luck (in
press) also failed to find increased interference from a memorized
object that returned as a distractor in a subsequent visual search
task. If anything, they found that a memory-matching distractor
was less disturbing than unrelated distractors, leading to speeded
reaction times (RTs) rather than slowed RTs. Woodman and Luck
therefore concluded that working memory content can also be
flexibly used to inhibit visual information.
Others have been more successful in finding increased distractor
effects in combined attention/working-memory tasks. Pashler and
Shiu (1999) asked participants to first form a mental image of an
object and then concentrate on the main task of extracting a target
digit from a rapid sequence of distractor pictures, one of which was
of the imaged object. Pashler and Shiu found that the matching
distractor picture affected the detection of a subsequently pre-
sented target. However, although this study provides strong evi-
dence for automatic attentional capture, it does not provide un-
equivocal evidence for a role of visual working memory in
inducing this capture. The capture may have been caused by
priming, rather than by memory, as the brief activation of an image
in itself may be sufficient to induce prioritization of a matching
object (cf. Theeuwes, Reimann, & Mortier, 2006). Indeed, Pashler
and Shiu (1999) found interference of the imaged object even
when observers were instructed to discard rather than remember
the initial image.
Moores, Laiti, and Chelazzi (2003) asked participants to search
for a particular target object (e.g., a lock) in a briefly presented
display containing several other objects. They found that observers
were more distracted when one of the nontarget objects was related
to the target (e.g., a key), as indicated by both eye movements and
RTs. Furthermore, on a free-recall test after the search display, the
participants more often reported the related objects than unrelated
control objects as present in the displays. Moores et al. concluded
that the activation of object representations in working memory
primes associated representations, which makes them either re-
ceive or attract more attention. However, this study does not
provide a strong test for pure memory-driven attentional capture.
Note that the Moores et al.’s findings are very much reminiscent of
the contingent attentional capture effect reported by Folk, Rem-
ington, and Johnston (1992). Folk et al. found that the effective-
ness of a cue on the selection of a target depended on the similarity
between the cue and the target-defining property. They concluded
that observers use a task-specific attentional set and that objects
matching this set will automatically capture attention. In the case
of Moores et al.’s (2003) study, this means that the target-related
objects may have captured attention because they were explicitly
related to the observer’s attentional set for the task at hand, not
because they were related to the working memory content per se.
In other words, although the use of an attentional set is likely to
involve working memory, this does not necessarily mean that the
reverse case—holding an object in working memory automatically
creates an attentional set for that object—is also true. To be able to
conclude that memory content drives visual attention, one needs to
demonstrate the presence of content-based effects when the mem-
ory task and the visual attention task are separate.
This was done in a series of experiments by Soto, Heinke,
Humphreys, and Blanco (2005). They asked their participants to
first remember a particular shape with a particular color (e.g., a red
triangle), then to search for a tilted line segment among upright
distractor line segments, and finally to perform a memory test.
Thus, the memory and search tasks were designed to involve two
different task sets. However, in terms of stimulus content, the two
tasks could overlap: The line segments of the search task were
each placed inside a shape that could match the to-be-remembered
item in shape, color, or both. Soto et al. found that search for the
tilted line was speeded when it was placed inside a (partially)
matching object, whereas it was slowed when one of the distractor
lines was placed inside the matching object. This suggests that
attention was guided by the memory content. Furthermore, an
increased distractor effect occurred even when the memory-
matching shape never coincided with the search target, suggesting
that attention was captured even though this was detrimental to the
task. These effects were not due to mere priming, because no
benefits or costs occurred when participants were not required to
remember the initial shape. Hence, Soto et al. concluded that visual
attention is guided by working memory content in an at least
partially automatic fashion.
However, these experiments are not without potential draw-
backs. Note that the to-be-memorized item was presented only
about 300 ms before the appearance of the search display, leaving
observers relatively little time to encode and consolidate the item
before they needed to switch tasks. Thus, observers may have
attended to the partly matching search object because they were
still busy encoding the to-be-memorized features, not because they
were retaining those features. Even if the to-be-memorized object
was encoded in time, there may still have been the risk of observ-
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ers deliberately using the matching item in one task (i.e., the search
task) as an aid in performing the other task (i.e., the subsequent
memory test). Soto, Humphreys, and Heinke (2006b) argued
against this on the basis of the observation that recollection did not
improve for to-be-memorized items that had returned in the visual
search task. However, memory performance in their task was
generally very high, with at least 93% correct, and ceiling effects
may therefore have prevented further improvements.
Perhaps the strongest evidence for memory-driven attentional
modulation, then, comes from Soto and Humphreys (2006), who
tested a group of parietal patients demonstrating visual extinction
of contralesional stimuli. They found that the extinction was re-
duced when the contralesional stimulus matched an earlier pre-
sented stimulus that had to be remembered. No such improvements
were found when the initial stimulus only needed to be viewed or
identified. Note that here the initial stimulus was presented for 1 to
3 s (with the target display following after 200 ms), which may be
considered sufficient for encoding and consolidation.
The Present Study
In sum, the evidence so far is mixed and, more often than not,
subject to alternative interpretations. In the present study we
sought to provide further evidence for the memory-driven atten-
tional capture hypothesis, while circumventing previous caveats.
Furthermore, we sought to extend the earlier evidence by answer-
ing questions such as, What are the differences between more
verbal versus more visual memory representations? What happens
when only part of an object needs to be remembered? What
happens to stimuli that are allowed to be forgotten? and What is
the exact nature of the memory-related interference effects?
Figure 1 illustrates the basic procedure underlying Experiment 1
and, in adapted form, also the subsequent experiments. Trials
started with the presentation of a disk, and in the memory condi-
tions, participants were asked to remember its color. After a few
seconds, a visual search display was presented consisting of a
number of disks and a diamond-shaped target. The target was not
always the only unique item in the display, because one of the
distractors could carry a unique color. We refer to this item as the
singleton distractor (after Pashler, 1988a). Previous research has
shown that the presence of a singleton distractor leads to increased
search RTs, even though it is never the target (Theeuwes, 1991,
1992). This indicates that it involuntarily captures attention. The
important manipulation here was that the singleton distractor,
when present, could carry the same color as the to-be-remembered
item. We hypothesized that if working memory involves the acti-
vation of content-specific representations that are shared by the
attentional system, then we should find increased interference
when the singleton distractor matches the to-be-remembered item
as compared with when it is unrelated.
Experiment 1 provided an initial test of such memory-driven
attentional capture and also provided a first control for priming by
including a viewing-without-remembering condition. However,
although Experiment 1 exposed an overall effect of memory load
on attentional capture, it failed to reveal any content-specific
capture effects. We hypothesized that participants may have used
a more verbal type of memory rather than a visual working
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the stimuli and procedure of Experiment 1. The different patterns
correspond to different colors.
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memory. This was tested in Experiments 2 and 3, in which ob-
servers were encouraged to use a more visual type of memory.
This time there was increased singleton distractor interference for
matching singletons. These experiments again controlled for prim-
ing, now by including the same (more verbal) memory condition as
in Experiment 1. Experiment 4 then investigated whether memory-
driven attentional capture is restricted to those dimensions that are
relevant to the memory task or whether working memory is
obliged to represent entire objects. Experiments 5 and 6 looked at
forgetting by investigating whether items that were initially mem-
orized but no longer needed still had an effect on singleton inter-
ference. Finally, Experiment 7 used eye movement measures to
assess the exact nature of the memory-related interference effects,
to see whether interference was due to increased attentional cap-
ture by, or instead delayed disengagement from, the memory-
related stimulus.
Because the target was always defined by a different dimension
than the singleton distractor (in this case shape vs. color), any
increased distractor effects would be unlikely due to a voluntary
attentional set for the distractor properties and more likely due to
automatic attentional capture instead. The risk for potential task
overlap was minimized in all of these experiments by the relatively
long duration between the memory task and the search task (up to
4 s in total), which should have given ample time to encode the
initial item and switch to the search task. Moreover, the search
target was always the same, making it easy to maintain the basic
task descriptions. Nevertheless, there may have been the risk of
participants using the matching singleton distractor to refresh their
memory of the to-be-remembered item. Experiments 4, 6, and 7
further controlled for this possibility by making the singleton
distractor related to the memorized item, but never identical.
Experiment 1: An Initial Test of Content-Based
Memory-Driven Attentional Capture
In the memory condition of the first experiment, participants
were required to remember an easily distinguishable color (red,
green, blue, or yellow) and subsequently search for a diamond in
a visual search display. The search display could contain a single-
ton distractor, which, when present, had the same color as the
memorized item or an unrelated color. A trial ended with a
memory test, in which the participants were asked to choose the
remembered color from three presented colors. The memory-
driven attentional capture hypothesis predicts increased search
RTs when the singleton distractor matches the memory content.
Performance in the memory condition was compared with a
no-memory condition, in which participants were instructed to
simply look at the initial colored disk, without the need to remem-
ber it. The no-memory condition had two purposes. First, it served
to ensure that any effects of the memorized item in the memory
condition were not simply due to priming (i.e., due to just having
seen the matching color). Second, it allowed for the assessment of
any general effects of working memory load on attentional capture,
irrespective of whether the content matched. Using very similar
visual search displays, Lavie and De Fockert (2005) found in-
creased distractor interference when participants had to simulta-
neously rehearse a series of up to six digits. Here we assessed
whether having to remember a single color would have a similar
effect on attentional capture.
Method
Participants. Twenty university students, aged 16 to 23 years (M 
19.6), participated in exchange for a payment of €7 (approximately $9.00)
per hour. All reported having normal or corrected-to-normal acuity and
color vision. One participant was left out of the analyses because he made
up to 50% errors in the search task, leaving a total of 19 participants.
Stimuli, apparatus, procedure, and design. An HP Compaq d530 CMT
Pentium IV computer running E-Prime (Psychology Software Tools, 2003)
generated the stimuli on an Iiyama Vision Master Pro 454 SVGA 120-Hz
screen and acquired the necessary response data through the standard
keyboard. All stimuli were presented on a black background (0.0 cd/m2) at
a viewing distance of 75 cm.
Each trial started with a brief instruction presented in gray (13 cd/m2, letter
height 0.2o) for 500 ms at the center of the display. The instruction read watch
in the no-memory condition and remember in the memory condition, referring
to what the participant should do with the subsequently presented item. This
item was a colored disk (radius 1.5o), which was presented for 1,000 ms at the
center of the display. It could be any of four main colors (red, green, yellow,
or blue, as was randomly determined with the constraint that each color was
featured equally often in each condition). Furthermore, the specific hue and
chroma of each color could vary randomly between any of nine different
combinations chosen on the basis of Munsell’s (1929) color system. The value
(brightness) of each color was kept constant at around 13 cd/m2, except for
yellow, which was brighter (42 cd/m2) in order to make it appear less brown.
The different color combinations used in this and subsequent experiments are
listed in Table 1. Note that these were only approximations of Munsell’s
original colors, owing to screen limitations.
The initial disk was followed by a blank period, which lasted 2,000 ms
in the practice blocks and 3,000 ms in the main blocks. In the practice
blocks, the blank period was followed for 1 s by another instruction (13
cd/m2, letter height 0.2o), which read search, in order to make participants
familiar with the alternation of the tasks. This was followed by a visual
search display, consisting of eight gray distractor disks (randomly varying
from 11 cd/m2 to 15 cd/m2; radius 1.2o) and one gray diamond-shaped
target (diagonal 3.0o), placed on the rim of an imaginary circle centered on
fixation (radius 5.3o). The search display remained visible until a response
was made. Participants were instructed to find the diamond as quickly as
possible without making too many errors and to indicate whether there was
an N or an M inside it (0.32o in size, presented in black) by pressing N or
M on the keyboard with the left middle and index finger, respectively. In
case of an incorrect response, a feedback message (Incorrect!) appeared for
250 ms. Inside the distractors a black symbol resembling an hour glass on
its side was drawn (||; matching the line segments of the N and M), to
which no response was required.
There were three different singleton distractor type conditions: On 50%
of the trials there was no singleton distractor. In the unrelated condition
(25% of the trials), one of the gray disks was replaced with a disk of a color
unrelated to the memorized or viewed item (e.g., green when the initial
item was red). In the same condition (25% of the trials), one of the gray
disks was replaced with a disk of the same color as the memorized or
viewed item (e.g., the same red as the initial item).
In the memory condition, the visual search display was followed, after
500 ms, by the memory test. This consisted of a central row of three disks
of different colors, including the memorized color, in randomized order
(e.g., yellow, blue, and red). Below the disks were the numbers 1, 2, and
3. The participants were instructed to indicate the to-be-remembered color
by pressing either 1, 2, or 3 on the numeric keypad, with the right index,
middle, or ring finger, respectively. An incorrect response was again
followed by a 250-ms feedback message. In the no-memory condition there
was no memory test. The trial ended with a blank screen for 1,500 ms.
All participants first practiced the no-memory condition for 32 trials,
then the memory condition for another 32 trials. After practice, four blocks
of each condition (no memory vs. memory) were completed in alternating
order, counterbalanced across participants. There were breaks in between
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blocks, in which participants were notified of their search RTs, search
accuracy, and memory accuracy. Each block consisted of 32 trials: 16
no-singleton distractor trials, 8 unrelated singleton distractor trials, and 8
same singleton distractor trials. In total, this resulted in 32 trials for each
singleton distractor type and memory type combination (64 trials for the
no-singleton distractor condition).
Results and Discussion
Error percentages and mean RTs were entered in an analysis of
variance (ANOVA) with memory type (no memory vs. memory)
and singleton distractor type (no, unrelated, or same distractor) as
factors. Table 2 shows the error percentages in the search and
memory tasks. On average, 3.3% search errors and 4.9% memory
errors were made. There were no significant effects of memory
type or singleton type involving either type of error (all Fs  1.8,
ns). Therefore, the remainder of our analyses focused on search
RTs. These analyses excluded trials on which a search error was
made and trials on which RTs were shorter than 200 ms or longer
than 3,000 ms (which constituted less than 1% of the trials in this
and subsequent experiments). They included trials on which a
memory error was made, however, so as to keep the analyses the
same as in later experiments, in which it was important to keep a
reasonably high number of trials.
Figure 2 reveals the main RT results. The presence of a single-
ton distractor led to slower search RTs, as confirmed by a main
effect of singleton distractor type, F(2, 36)  21.20, MSE 
2,811.97, p  .001. The presence of an additional memory task
also resulted in increased search times, as indicated by a main
effect of memory type, F(1, 18)  10.77, MSE  14,766.92, p 
.01. There was also an interaction between memory type and
singleton distractor type, F(2, 36)  12.86, MSE  1,484.91, p 
.001. Figure 2 shows that the presence of a singleton distractor led
to greater interference in search under conditions of memory load.
The important question then was whether this relative increase in
distractor interference under memory conditions was at least par-
tially content specific. For this we looked only at the conditions in
which a singleton distractor was present. Did the same color
distractor result in slower RTs than the unrelated distractor in the
memory condition relative to the no-memory condition? Figure 2
suggests not, as was confirmed by the lack of a statistical differ-
ence between the two conditions (singleton distractor type, F 1);
there was a trend toward a Memory Type  Singleton Distractor
Type interaction, F(1, 18)  3.64, MSE  2,006.32, p  .10, but
Table 2
Error Percentages for the Search and Memory Tasks of
Experiment 1
Experiment Task (condition)
Singleton distractor type
None Unrelated Same
1 Search (no-memory condition) 3.2 4.0 3.8
Search (memory condition) 3.2 3.5 2.0
Memory (memory condition) 4.7 5.6 4.3
2 Search (more verbal condition) 5.2 6.1 6.2
Search (more visual condition) 5.3 6.1 6.5
Memory (more verbal condition) 5.3 5.9 4.9
Memory (more visual condition) 40.1 40.7 40.2
3 Search (more verbal condition) 4.6 3.3 3.7
Search (more visual condition) 3.9 4.5 3.4
Memory (more verbal condition) 7.3 9.5 5.8
Memory (more visual condition) 30.3 28.8 30.3
Table 1
The Colors Used in Experiments 1, 2, and 3 and Subsequent
Experiments
Munsell (as chosen) CIE (as measured)
Hue Value Chroma x y
Luminance
(cd/m2)
Red
3R 5 18 0.563 0.314 12.5
3R 5 16 0.544 0.308 11.8
3R 5 14 0.524 0.308 11.6
5R 5 18 0.599 0.335 12.3
5R 5 16 0.585 0.331 11.6
5R 5 14 0.561 0.331 11.5
7R 5 18 0.612 0.346 12.1
7R 5 16 0.604 0.346 11.6
7R 5 14 0.585 0.349 11.4
Green
6GY 5 10 0.331 0.582 12.7
6GY 5 8 0.344 0.567 12.5
6GY 5 6 0.348 0.530 12.5
8GY 5 10 0.309 0.598 13.1
8GY 5 8 0.318 0.573 12.6
8GY 5 6 0.319 0.517 12.3
10GY 5 10 0.293 0.600 13.4
10GY 5 8 0.297 0.557 13.0
10GY 5 6 0.294 0.499 12.7
Blue
5.5PB 5 16 0.168 0.146 14.8
5.5PB 5 14 0.171 0.153 14.2
5.5PB 5 12 0.176 0.162 13.9
7.5PB 5 16 0.176 0.136 13.3
7.5PB 5 14 0.183 0.146 13.4
7.5PB 5 12 0.189 0.157 13.6
8.5PB 5 16 0.187 0.137 13.5
8.5PB 5 14 0.193 0.148 13.7
8.5PB 5 12 0.199 0.158 13.8
Yellow
1Y 8 12 0.445 0.488 41.6
1Y 8 10 0.428 0.478 41.8
1Y 8 8 0.400 0.446 41.9
3Y 8 12 0.436 0.496 41.6
3Y 8 10 0.426 0.490 41.4
3Y 8 8 0.399 0.459 41.9
5Y 8 12 0.431 0.500 40.6
5Y 8 10 0.419 0.503 41.2
5Y 8 8 0.396 0.474 41.5
Note. The Munsell values (R red; G green; Y yellow; P purple;
B  blue) were converted to red, green, and blue (RGB) values by a
computer program called Munsell Conversion (Gretagmacbeth, 2004).
However, the colors on the screen did not exactly match the original
Munsell colors, because computer screens have only a limited color space,
and our screens were not calibrated to the Munsell system. CIE  Com-
mission Internationale d’Eclairage values.
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this went in the opposite direction of that expected on the basis of
content-specific memory-driven attentional capture.
Confirming earlier findings, the results show that singleton
distractors capture attention (despite being detrimental to the
task; cf. Theeuwes, 1991, 1992), but especially so under con-
ditions of memory load (Lavie & De Fockert, 2005). As has
been suggested by Lavie and colleagues (e.g., Lavie, Hirst, De
Fockert, & Viding, 2004), the additional memory task drains
cognitive control mechanisms necessary to reject interfering
information.
There was no sign of priming: In the no-memory condition there
was no increased distractor effect for matching singletons relative
to unrelated singletons. However, nor were there any signs of
memory-driven attentional capture: The increased singleton dis-
tractor effect was also blind to the specific color held in memory.
There may be several reasons for why the present experiment
failed to demonstrate memory-driven attentional capture. We pro-
pose that the memory representation and the visual input may have
been relatively protected from each other (cf. Downing & Dodds,
2004). One reason for this might be that the memory item could
easily be remembered verbally rather than visually. Note that there
was no real reason for participants to maintain a visual represen-
tation of the color, because the color’s name would simply suffice
to distinguish it from the other colors presented at the memory test.
Thus, content-specific interactions between working memory and
visual attention may have been absent simply because no visual
content was activated. This possibility was addressed in Experi-
ment 2.
Experiment 2: Looking for “More Visual”
Working-Memory/Attention Interactions
In Experiment 2 we tried to encourage participants to use a
memory that was more visual in nature. We did this by giving
instruction to use a more visual type of memory and by changing
the memory test at the end of the trial. The procedure is illustrated
in Figure 3. Crucially, in the more visual condition, the memorized
color had to be distinguished from subtle variants of the same
color. For instance, it could be that a specific shade of red had to
be distinguished from a slightly less saturated red and a slightly
more rusty red. These variants of the same color were difficult to
remember, presumably because it was difficult to come up with an
appropriate verbal label. Hence we hypothesized that participants
would use a memory of a more visual character. Performance was
compared with a condition that was the same as the memory
condition of Experiment 1, in which the memorized color had to be
distinguished from other canonical colors (e.g., red among blue
and green). We hypothesized that participants could thus use a
more verbal description of the color, and hence we labeled this
condition the more verbal condition. If memory-driven attentional
capture depends on the use of a more visual type of working
memory, then we should find a content-specific interaction be-
tween singleton distractor type and memory type in the more
visual condition but not in the more verbal condition.2
Method
Participants. Thirty-one university students, aged 15 to 24 years (M
18.5), participated in exchange for a payment of €7 (approximately $9.00)
per hour. All reported having normal or corrected-to-normal acuity and
color vision. One participant was dropped from the analyses because of
exceptionally high RTs (1,500 ms) in combination with a relatively high
percentage of outliers (3%) and memory errors (55%). This left a total of
30 participants.
Stimuli, apparatus, procedure, and design. The method was the same
as in Experiment 1, except for the following differences. The intertrial
interval was 2,000 ms instead of 1,500 ms. About halfway through the
experiment the computers in the lab were replaced. The first part of the
experiment (12 participants) was run on Dell Optiplex GX1 Pentium III
machines with Dell VGA monitors, the second part (18 participants) on the
same HP Compaq machines and monitors as in Experiment 1 (Experiment
2 was run before Experiment 1). Owing to the different monitors, this also
meant that the color values for the first group deviated somewhat from
those mentioned in Table 1 (which presents the values for the new mon-
itors). However, there was no difference in results between the two groups,
and their data were pooled.
The important change in design was that the no-memory condition was
dropped. Instead, two variants of the memory task were used. The more
verbal condition was the same as the memory condition of Experiment 1.
At test, the participant was required to distinguish the memorized color
(e.g., red) from among two other main colors (e.g., green and blue).
Because the colors were so different, a verbal representation would suffice
to do the task (hence the label more verbal for this condition). This was
also explained to the participants, and they received the instruction to either
“remember the global color” (first version of the experiment) or “remem-
ber the color verbally” (second version) in this condition. In the more
visual condition, everything was the same as in the more verbal condition
except the memory test at the end of the trial and the instruction. Now
observers had to distinguish the memorized color (e.g., red) from other
shades of the same color (e.g., a slightly less saturated red and a slightly
more rusty red). These shades were randomly chosen from the nine
different chroma and hue combinations listed in Table 1. The instruction
now was to “remember the precise color” (first version) or “remember the
color visually” (second version; as with the color differences, the differ-
2 Note that we use the stipulation more to express the fact that we cannot
be sure that observers used only visual working memory and no other types
of memory at all. This may even be quite unlikely. The label more visual
is meant to convey that the type of memory used is probably more visual
in character than in the other, more verbal condition.
Figure 2. Mean reaction time (RT) results as a function of memory type
(no-memory task vs. memory task) and singleton distractor type (no
singleton, unrelated singleton, or identical singleton) in Experiment 1.
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ence in instructions between versions appeared to have little effect on the
results).
The two different memory types (more verbal vs. more visual) were
blocked, with singleton distractor type (none, related, same) randomly
mixed within blocks. Participants first practiced the more verbal task for 32
trials and then practiced the more visual task for 32 trials. In the first
version of the experiment, participants then received 6 blocks of 32 trials
(3 for each memory type); in the second version, participants received 12
blocks of 32 trials (6 for each memory type). The order of nonpractice
blocks was counterbalanced across participants.
Results and Discussion
Error percentages and mean RTs were entered in an ANOVA
with memory type (more verbal vs. more visual) and singleton
distractor type (no, unrelated, or same distractor) as factors. Table
2 shows the error percentages in the search and memory tasks. On
average, 5.9% search errors were made, and there were no signif-
icant differences between conditions (all Fs 1.7, ns). In the more
verbal memory task, on average 5.4% errors were made. In the
more visual memory task, the mean error rate was significantly
higher, at 40.4%, F(1, 29)  669.57, MSE  0.008, p  .001,
indicating that this task was indeed more difficult than the more
verbal version. There were no effects of, or interactions with,
singleton distractor type (all Fs  1, ns).
The RT analyses included the trials on which a memory error
was made, to keep the number of trials per cell at a reasonable
level. We assumed that many errors in the more visual memory
task were due to task difficulty, not due to a failure to comply with
task instructions. Figure 4 shows the main results. In general, the
presence of a singleton distractor led to slower search RTs: sin-
gleton distractor type, F(2, 58)  60.86, MSE  2,933.48, p 
.001. There was no overall effect of memory type (F  1.3, ns).
However, there was a Memory Type  Singleton Distractor Type
interaction, F(2, 58)  5.13, MSE  1,316.82, p  .01. Figure 4
indicates that singleton distractors matching the memorized color
led to an increase in search RTs relative to unrelated singleton
distractors (as well as no singleton distractor trials), but only in the
more visual condition. A separate analysis on only the unrelated
and same singleton distractor conditions again revealed a signifi-
cant Memory Type  Singleton Distractor Type interaction, F(1,
29)  6.34, MSE  1,615.02, p  .02, further confirming the
content-related interaction.
Figure 3. Schematic representation of the stimuli and procedure of Experiment 2. The different patterns
correspond to different color categories (red, green, blue, and yellow). Different orientations of a pattern
correspond to subtle variants of a color.
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The results provide evidence for memory-driven attentional
capture. In the more visual memory condition, interference in-
creased for same singleton distractors relative to unrelated or
absent distractors and relative to the more verbal memory condi-
tion. These additional costs were not due to a general increase in
task difficulty, because this would have predicted additional costs
for the unrelated singleton distractors too. Priming can also be
largely excluded as a possibility. There was no increased interfer-
ence for same distractors in the more verbal condition of the
current experiment, even though an item had to be attended and
remembered. However, priming may still play some role if we
assume that the priming strength depends on the amount of atten-
tion paid to the prime. Because the more visual memory task was
more difficult than the more verbal memory task, participants may
have invested more attention in the memory item, which may have
resulted in stronger priming in subsequent search displays. We
return to this possibility in Experiments 5 and 6.
Another alternative explanation that cannot be excluded at this
stage is that observers, realizing that the singleton distractor of the
visual search display could be the same as the to-be-remembered
item, attended to it in order to use it as a reminder of what the
to-be-remembered item looked like—even though this strategy
would be detrimental to the search task. We tried to prevent this
occurrence by making the singleton distractor the same on only a
minority (25%) of trials, but the more visual condition may have
been perceived as so difficult that participants believed it would
pay off to attend to the singleton distractor. This explanation was
controlled for in Experiments 4 and 6. Before that, in Experiment
3 we sought to replicate Experiment 2, but now using shape instead
of color as the to-be-memorized dimension.
Experiment 3: Shape-Based Memory-Driven
Attentional Capture
In Experiment 3, participants were asked to remember a shape
instead of a color. The remembered shape could then return as a
singleton distractor in the subsequent search display, in which the
target was now the dimmer circle among brighter circle distractors.
See Figure 5 for an illustration of the stimuli and procedure. As in
Experiment 2, there were two types of memory test: one allowed
for more verbal encoding, and the other was assumed to require
more visual encoding. In the more verbal condition, the memo-
rized shape (e.g., a star) could be distinguished from other canon-
ical shapes such as a rectangle, triangle, and diamond. In the more
visual condition, the memorized shape needed to be distinguished
from subtle variants of its own category (in this example, other
stars). These variants were created by slightly shifting the position
of the apices in a random direction.
Method
Participants. Thirty-two university students, aged 17 to 33 years (M
22.4), participated in exchange for a payment of €7 (approximately $9.00)
per hour. All reported having normal or corrected-to-normal acuity and
color vision.
Stimuli, apparatus, procedure, and design. The method was the same
as in Experiment 2 except for the following changes. The entire experiment
was run on the HP/Compaq machines (as were the remainder of the
experiments in this article). There were 6 blocks of 64 trials instead of 12
blocks of 32 trials. The greatest change involved the stimuli used. Instead
of remembering a color, participants were now required to remember an
outline shape (about 3° in diameter), drawn in gray (39 cd/m2). The shape
was randomly selected from four main categories: stars, rectangles, trian-
gles, and diamonds (with the restriction that each category occurred equally
often). On each trial, subtle variants were created for each category by
randomly displacing the coordinates of the shape’s apices by between 0°
and 0.15°. One problem with presenting shapes on a computer screen is
that the edges often looked jagged (“aliased”) because of the limited pixel
resolution. Pilot testing revealed that observers could use this jaggedness to
recognize the shapes in the memory task. To prevent this problem, the
to-be-memorized shape was presented more peripherally, at the same
eccentricity as the items in the search display (5.3o), with the restriction
that the to-be-memorized item was never presented in the same position as
the subsequent singleton distractor or search target. Furthermore, the
to-be-memorized item was presented only briefly, for 150 ms, in order to
prevent eye movements and the accompanying increase in resolution.
Although the presentation was brief, the participants were still allowed
ample time to process the shape (4,000 ms), probably using iconic memory
(Sperling, 1960).
The target of the visual search display was a relatively dim (16 cd/m2)
outline circle. In the no singleton distractor condition, all distractors were
39 cd/m2 gray outline circles. In the unrelated singleton distractor condi-
tion, one of the distractor circles was replaced with an outline shape from
a different category than the memorized shape, whereas in the same
singleton distractor condition it was identical to the memorized shape.
Subsequently, at the memory test, the participant was required to choose
the remembered shape from three alternatives. In the more verbal condi-
tion, the alternatives were from different categories. We assumed that
observers could use verbal labels to fulfill this task. To promote them doing
so, we instructed them to remember the “global shape.” Moreover, during
the first 16 practice trials, we presented the to-be-memorized shape to-
gether with the appropriate verbal label star, rectangle, triangle, or dia-
mond. In the more visual condition, the alternatives were from the same
category, making it more difficult to use verbal labels. In this condition the
participants were instructed to remember the “precise shape.” We assumed
that they would use a more visual memory for this task.
Results and Discussion
The data were analyzed in the same way as in Experiment 2.
Table 2 shows the error percentages in the search and memory
tasks. On average, 3.9% search errors were made. There were no
Figure 4. Mean reaction time (RT) results as a function of memory type
(more verbal vs. more visual) and singleton distractor type (no singleton,
unrelated singleton, or identical singleton) in Experiment 2.
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main effects of memory type and singleton type (Fs 1.1, ns), but
there was a significant interaction, F(2, 62)  3.33, MSE  0.001,
p  .05. Relative to the more verbal condition, slightly fewer
errors were made in the more visual condition for no singleton and
same singleton distractor trials, whereas slightly more errors were
made for unrelated singleton distractor trials. Even though the
differences were only small (see Table 2), this pattern does go
against the pattern of RTs, raising the possibility of a speed–
accuracy trade-off. However, because we found no evidence for
such a trade-off in Experiment 2 and other experiments, and the
random mixing of singleton types makes it an unlikely conscious
strategy on behalf of the observers, we do not consider this finding
as too serious a problem here.
In the more verbal memory task, on average 7.5% errors were
made. In the more visual memory task, the mean error rate was
significantly higher, at 29.8%, F(1, 29)  669.57, MSE  0.008,
p  .001. There was also an interaction between memory type and
singleton distractor type, F(2, 62)  4.71, MSE  0.003, p  .05.
This was mainly due to the relatively high number of memory
errors made when an unrelated singleton had been present in the
more verbal task, followed by the no singleton and the same
singleton distractor conditions. It is possible that in memory tests
of the more verbal type, participants chose the unrelated single-
ton’s category rather than the memorized item’s category. This
was not possible in the more visual condition, as there, all test
items were of the same category.
Overall, the RTs were about 25% longer than in Experiment 1
and 2, suggesting that the search task used here was more difficult.
Because of this, we increased the cutoff limit by 25% to 4,000 ms
(which resulted in exclusion of less than 1% of the trials). Figure
6 shows the main results. In general, the presence of a singleton
distractor led to slower search RTs: singleton distractor type, F(2,
62)  47.53, MSE  7,717.60, p  .001. There was no overall
effect of memory type (F  1, ns). However, there was a Memory
Type  Singleton Distractor Type interaction, F(2, 62)  3.21,
MSE  3,048.73, p  .05. Figure 6 indicates that singleton
distractors matching the memorized shape led to an increase in
search RTs relative to unrelated singleton distractors, but only in
the more visual condition. A separate analysis on the unrelated and
same singleton distractors again revealed a significant Memory
Type  Singleton Distractor Type interaction, F(1, 31)  4.88,
MSE  3,905.06, p  .05, confirming the content-related
interaction.
Experiment 2 showed that under visual memory conditions,
singletons matching a memorized item in terms of color capture
attention. The present experiment shows the same outcome, but
Figure 5. Schematic representation of the stimuli and procedure of Experiment 3.
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now for shape. We propose that attentional capture can be driven
by visual working memory content and that this mechanism gen-
eralizes across different visual dimensions. However, the objec-
tions against Experiment 2 also hold here. Perhaps the stronger
interference in the more visual condition occurs because the more
difficult memory task demands more attention, leading to stronger
priming effects. Furthermore, the more difficult memory task may
entice participants to use the singleton distractor to refresh their
memories. We return to these potential problems in the subsequent
experiments.
Experiment 4: Remembering Features or Entire Objects?
When, in Experiment 2, participants were asked to remember
the color of a disk, did they remember just the color or the entire
disk? Likewise, in Experiment 3, when they were asked to remem-
ber the shape, did they also remember the shade of gray it was
drawn in? In other words, does visual working memory maintain
only the feature relevant to the task, or is it obliged to store the
entire object—that is, the entire conjunction of features?
Vogel, Woodman, and Luck (2001) estimated that visual work-
ing memory capacity is sufficient to hold about four features.
Interestingly, they also found that four conjunctions of features
could be held without much additional cost, suggesting that visual
working memory can store an entire object as a unit. However, the
finding that visual working memory can store entire objects just as
efficiently as it can store single features does not mean it is obliged
to do so. Visual attention studies have suggested that observers can
selectively attend to a single feature of an object without the
object’s other features becoming as activated as the attended
attribute (e.g., Corbetta, Miezin, Dobmeyer, Shulman, & Petersen,
1990; Mu¨ller, Heller, & Ziegler, 1995). On the basis of our
hypothesis that visual attention and visual working memory share
the same representations, we might expect that visual working
memory can be equally selective.
Experiment 4 tested this prediction by always presenting a
to-be-remembered item that carried a specific color (of the kinds
used in Experiments 1 and 2), as well as a specific shape (of the
kinds used in Experiment 3; see Figure 7 for an illustration).
Crucially, in the color memory condition, only the color of the
initial object would be assessed at the memory test. In the shape
memory condition, only the shape of the initial object would be
tested. These conditions were blocked. Thus, it would be sufficient
to remember the relevant property, without the need to remember
the entire object. To investigate whether observers indeed priori-
tize the relevant feature within working memory, we allowed the
singleton distractor in the visual search display to be one of four
types. The unrelated singleton distractor was different from the
memorized object in terms of both color and shape and served as
a baseline condition. The color-related singleton had the same
main color as the memorized object but not the same shape. If
visual working memory is feature specific, then we would expect
increased interference only if color is the relevant dimension. The
shape-related singleton had a shape of the same category as the
memorized object but not the same color. Again, a feature-specific
memory would predict increased interference here, but now only
when shape was relevant to the memory task. For the both-related
singleton, both color and shape were of the same categories as for
the memorized item. In this condition we would expect increased
interference when either dimension was relevant to the memory
task.
Experiment 4 also controlled for an alternative explanation of
the results so far, namely, that participants may have strategically
used (and therefore attended to) the identical singleton distractor in
the visual search displays in order to refresh their memories. In the
present experiment this was no longer possible. Now, the related
singleton was of the same category as the memorized item (e.g.,
they could both be red and/or both be stars), but it was never
identical (i.e., of the same subvariant). Observers were explicitly
told that the to-be-memorized item and the singleton distractor
were always different and that the latter would therefore not be
helpful (and actually be quite obstructive) in remembering the
former.
Method
Participants. Twenty-two students, aged 19 to 37 years (M  22
years), participated in exchange for monetary compensation of €7 (approx-
imately $9.00) per hour. They reported having normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. One participant was replaced because he performed at
chance level in the memory task.
Stimuli, apparatus, procedure, and design. The stimuli and procedure
followed those of the more visual memory conditions of Experiments 2 and
3, with the following changes. The target of the visual search display was
now defined by size: It was smaller than the distractors (0.8° vs. 1.2°
radius). The memory item varied in both shape and color (using the same
shapes and colors as in the previous experiments). In the color memory
blocks, observers were instructed to remember the color; in the shape
memory blocks, they were instructed to remember the shape (and treat the
respective other dimension as irrelevant). Within these blocks, only the
relevant dimension would be assessed at the memory test. In the color
memory condition, the three alternatives of the memory test all had the
same shape but varied slightly in color; in the shape memory condition, the
alternatives all had the same color but varied slightly in terms of shape.
There were two practice blocks of 16 trials for each of the two memory
conditions (color and shape). For each memory condition there were two
experimental blocks, the order of which was counterbalanced. Within each
block there were four singleton distractor conditions, randomly mixed. All
singleton distractors deviated in terms of color and shape from the remain-
Figure 6. Mean reaction time (RT) results as a function of memory type
(more verbal vs. more visual) and singleton distractor type (no singleton,
unrelated singleton, or identical singleton) in Experiment 3.
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ing search elements. In the unrelated condition, the singleton distractor
shared neither color nor shape with the to-be-memorized item. In the
color-related condition it shared color but not shape, and vice versa in the
shape-related condition. Finally, in the both-related condition, the singleton
shared both color and shape with the memory item. In contrast to the
previous experiments, the singleton was never identical to the memorized
item; it could only be related. For instance, if the memorized item was a
particular shade of red, then the color-related singleton would be a different
shade of red. The same principle held for shape. Participants were notified
that the singleton would never be exactly the same as the to-be-memorized
item. The related singleton could return as an alternative in the memory
test, but this was determined completely randomly (i.e., the related single-
ton had no more chance of returning as a foil than any of the other color
or shape variations). Within each block there were 16 trials per singleton
distractor type, except for the unrelated singleton, of which there were 48.
Thus, each block contained 96 trials, which resulted in 384 trials in total.
Results and Discussion
The data were entered in an ANOVA with memory type (color
vs. shape) and singleton distractor type (unrelated, color-related,
shape-related, or both-related) as factors. Table 3 shows the error
percentages in the search and memory tasks. On average, 5.0%
search errors were made. The analysis revealed a trend toward an
interaction, F(3, 63)  2.71, MSE  0.001, p  .052. Table 3
indicates a content-specific effect in the color- and shape-related
conditions: More search errors were made when the singleton
carried a feature that was related to the relevant dimension of the
memorized item relative to when it carried a related feature that
was irrelevant to the memory task. In the memory task, on average
43.4% errors were made. Overall, more errors were made in the
color memory task (52.5%) than in the shape memory task
(34.3%), F(1, 21)  104.96, MSE  0.014, p  .001, suggesting
that the latter task was easier. More errors were made when the
singleton was similar in both color and shape to the memorized
item, F(3, 63)  2.97, MSE  0.006, p  .05. This may suggest
that the singleton distractor in the search display interfered with
the content of visual working memory. Note further that in the
present experiment, the singleton distractor was never identical to
the memorized item, to prevent observers from using the distrac-
tors as a memory aid. Instead it could be related. However, this
raises the possibility that now observers actively used the singleton
Figure 7. Schematic representation of the stimuli and procedure of Experiment 4. The different patterns
correspond to different color categories (red, green, blue, and yellow). Different orientations of a pattern
correspond to subtle variants of a color.
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distractor as a way to decide against one of the alternatives in the
subsequent memory test. There were three response alternatives in
the memory test, and the singleton may have returned as one of the
two foils. As there were 9 color variations and 10 shape variations,
the chances of this occurring were 22.2% (i.e., 2  11.1%) and
20% (i.e., 2  10%), respectively. If participants used the single-
ton distractor in order to exclude one of the foils, we would expect
a bias against the selection of such matching foils. However, no
such bias was found: On the trials on which an incorrect probe was
selected, in 11.6% of the color memory trials the matching foil
was selected, and in the remaining 10.6% the nonmatching foil
was chosen. In the shape memory condition these percentages
were 11.7% and 8.3%, respectively. So, if anything, there was a
bias toward the matching foil, not against it (this was not signif-
icant, though: overall p  .30).
Figure 8 shows the mean RTs. Overall, RTs appeared somewhat
faster in the shape memory condition than in the color memory
condition, but this was not significant (memory type: F  1.0, ns).
There was a main effect of singleton distractor type; singletons that
shared a feature with the memorized item resulted in increased
search RTs, especially when both color and shape were related,
F(3, 63)  6.56, MSE  1,485.42, p  .001. The most interesting
effect was a Memory Type  Singleton Type interaction, F(3,
63)  3.31, MSE  2,385.01, p  .05. As can be seen from
Figure 8, whereas both-related singletons were always more dis-
ruptive than unrelated singletons, color- and shape-related single-
tons were only more disruptive if they carried the feature that was
relevant to the memory task. An additional ANOVA including
only the color- and shape-related singletons confirmed the inter-
action, F(1, 21) 9.13, MSE 2,502.02, p .01; an ANOVA on
only the unrelated and both-related singletons showed no interac-
tion (F  1, ns).
Taken together, both the accuracy and the RT data suggest that
visual working memory can selectively retain specific features of
an attended object. The content-specific interactions indicate that
observers retain color when color is important, and shape when
shape is important, but that the object’s other main attribute can be
ignored. Apparently it is not obligatory to fully represent the entire
object in visual working memory.
The fact that the relevant feature is more actively represented
than the irrelevant feature does not mean that the irrelevant feature
is not activated at all. A functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) study by O’Craven, Downing, and Kanwisher (1999) mea-
sured the activation of brain areas associated with the different
attributes of attended and unattended stimuli. They found that
whereas the relevant attribute of the attended object led to the
strongest activation, the activation associated with the irrelevant
attribute of the attended object was still stronger than the activation
associated with the attributes of the unattended object, even though
the attended and unattended objects were superimposed on the
same position.
A study by Pratt and Hommel (2003) is also relevant here. In
their Experiment 4, participants searched an array of items for a
target that matched the shape of a preceding cue (either a circle or
a square). It was therefore relevant to remember the shape of the
cue. The cue also varied in color (between red, green, blue, and
white), but this was irrelevant to the task. Between the cue and the
target display, a set of colored arrows appeared, one of them
pointing toward the subsequent target. Pratt and Hommel found
that even though the color of the cue was irrelevant to the task,
performance improved when the arrow pointing to the target
carried the same color. Contrary to our conclusion, they concluded
that participants store an integrated representation of both the
relevant and the irrelevant properties in working memory. It is also
possible that in our study the irrelevant features were still activated
but that our behavioral measures were simply not sensitive enough
to pick up on such activation. One difference between our exper-
iment and Experiment 4 of Pratt and Hommel (2003) is that in
theirs the memorized object was directly relevant to the search
task, whereas in ours it was not. This may mean that their partic-
ipants much more actively maintained the object’s representation,
whereas our participants may have put the memory representation
on the “back burner” while performing the search task. In any case,
Figure 8. Mean reaction time (RT) results as a function of memory type
(color memory vs. shape memory) and singleton distractor type (unrelated,
color related, shape related, or both related) in Experiment 4.
Table 3
Error Percentages in the Search and Memory Tasks of Experiment 4
Task (condition)
Singleton distractor type
Unrelated Color-related Shape-related Both-related
Search (color memory) 5.2 6.8 5.1 4.8
Search (shape memory) 4.6 3.7 5.8 4.4
Memory (color memory) 52.5 51.8 50.7 54.8
Memory (shape memory) 34.2 32.5 32.9 37.7
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Pratt and Hommel’s finding does not negate our conclusion that
visual working memory can selectively prioritize relevant features.
Experiment 5: Release From Memory
So far we have hypothesized that it is the active maintenance of
items (or their features) in visual working memory that affects
visual attention. If so, then items that are no longer retained in
working memory should lose their effect on search. Experiment 5
explored the fate of once remembered items that were no longer
relevant. There were two main conditions, both of which started
with the presentation of a to-be-memorized color. Figure 9 illus-
trates these conditions. The search before memory condition was
the same as the more visual memory condition of Experiment 2:
Following the initial stimulus, participants first performed the
search task (in which the color could return as a singleton distrac-
tor) and then performed the memory test. Thus, as before, the
memory item had to be retained during search. In the search after
memory condition, the participants first completed the memory test
and then performed the search task. In this condition the memory
item was no longer relevant by the time the search display ap-
peared. If retention is no longer necessary and the item can be
successfully released, the content-related attentional capture
should disappear.
Furthermore, this experiment provided another control for prim-
ing effects. In the search after memory condition, participants were
exposed twice to the memory item before search commenced
(once at encoding and once at test). Therefore, contrary to the
working memory explanation, we would expect stronger priming
effects in this condition than in the search before memory condi-
tion, in which observers were exposed only once to the memory
item before search started.
Method
Participants. Twenty-four students, aged 17 to 38 years (M  21.7
years), participated in exchange for monetary compensation of €7 (approx-
imately $9.00) per hour. They reported having normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. Two participants were dropped from the analyses because
they committed more than 25% errors in one of the search conditions,
leaving 22 participants in total.
Stimuli, apparatus, procedure, and design. In the search before mem-
ory condition, the stimuli and procedure were identical to the more visual
memory condition of Experiment 2 except for two changes: The time
between the to-be-memorized item and the search display was increased to
5,000 ms, and the time to respond to the memory displays was limited to
3,000 ms. In the search after memory condition, the two tasks were
reversed. The initial to-be-memorized item was first followed by a blank
for 2,000 ms, after which the memory test appeared for a maximum of
3,000 ms. If participants responded faster than 3,000 ms, the remaining
time was filled with a blank, so that altogether, by the time the search
display appeared, 5,000 ms had passed (matching the same period in the
search before memory condition). The search display appeared until a
response was made. The participants first practiced the search before
memory condition for 32 trials and then the search after memory condition
for 32 trials. They then completed 12 blocks of 32 trials each, 6 for each
Figure 9. Schematic representation of the stimuli and procedure of Experiment 5. The different patterns
correspond to different color categories (red, green, blue, and yellow). Different orientations of a pattern
correspond to subtle variants of a color.
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condition, in counterbalanced order. Each block contained 8 unrelated, 8
same, and 16 no singleton distractor trials, randomly mixed. In total, this
resulted in 48 trials per combination of task order and singleton distractor
type (96 for the no singleton distractor condition).
Results and Discussion
The data were analyzed with task order (search after memory,
search before memory) and singleton distractor type (none, unre-
lated, same) as factors. Table 4 shows the error percentages in the
search and memory tasks. On average, 3.9% search errors were
made. There was a strong trend toward more errors when the
memory task was completed first (search after memory condition,
4.4%) than when the search task was completed first (search before
memory condition, 3.5%): task order, F(1, 21)  4.15, MSE 
0.001, p  .054. There were no other main effects or interactions
(all Fs  1, ns). On average, 44.5% memory errors were made,
with more errors when the search task was completed first (48.7%)
than when the memory task was completed first (40.3%), F(1,
21)  34.16, MSE  0.007, p  .001. There was a trend toward
more memory errors when a singleton distractor was present in the
search displays, F(2, 42)  2.63, MSE  0.004, p  .084. There
was no interaction between task order and singleton distractor type
(F  1, ns).
Figure 10 shows the mean search RTs. Overall, the presence of
a singleton distractor led to slower responses: singleton distractor
type, F(2, 62)  47.53, MSE  7,717.60, p  .001. There was a
nonsignificant tendency to respond more slowly when the search
task was completed before the memory task than the other way
around: task order, F(1, 21)  2.45, MSE  2,115.76, p  .13.
Most important was the Task Order  Singleton Distractor Type
interaction, F(2, 42)  6.88, MSE  997.75, p  .01. As can be
seen from Figure 10, singleton distractors matching the memory
content led to increased RTs, but only when the memory task was
yet to be completed (search before memory condition). A separate
analysis only on the unrelated and same singleton distractors
confirmed the interaction, F(1, 21)  7.84, MSE  1,586.68, p 
.02.
The results further confirm the content-based memory-driven
attentional capture found in the previous experiments. Here, sin-
gleton distractors that matched the memorized items were more
disruptive than unrelated singletons, but only when the memorized
item had yet to be reported—in other words, when it was presum-
ably still maintained in working memory. No content-based inter-
actions were found when the memory test had just been completed.
This means that information that has become irrelevant to the task
can be effectively and relatively quickly released from visual
working memory and lose its effect on visual attention. It also
again means that the results so far have been due not to passive
priming effects but to active maintenance of task-relevant
information.
Experiment 6: Interference Reduction?
So far we have shown that the active maintenance of features in
visual working memory interacts with attending to those same
features in the outside world. However, in order to retain infor-
mation in working memory it is important not only to keep the
relevant content active but also to protect it against interference
from irrelevant information. It has been proposed that one function
of working memory is that such irrelevant stimuli are actively
rejected or suppressed while current task goals are maintained
(e.g., Lavie, 2000; Miller & Cohen, 2001). If so, then such
memory-based rejection or suppression mechanisms may exert
their influence on visual attention, in the same way as the active
content maintenance mechanisms do.
In this experiment, on every trial, participants were initially
required to remember two colors (see Figure 11 for an illustration).
After these colors had disappeared, a cue indicated which of the
two colors would really be relevant for the remainder of the
trial—the color that would be regarded as correct at the later
memory test. Because the irrelevant color would also initially have
to be remembered, we speculated that after the cue, observers
might have to reject or suppress it in order to prevent it from
interfering with the relevant memory content. If this rejection or
suppression carries over to the visual search display, we may now
expect less interference from singleton distractors carrying the
irrelevant color. The first purpose of Experiment 6 was to test this
prediction.
The second purpose of Experiment 6 was to provide a final
control for visual priming effects. In the preceding experiments,
content-related effects may have been stronger in the more visual
memory conditions not because of visual working memory content
but because these conditions were simply more difficult, required
Figure 10. Mean reaction time (RT) results as a function of task order
(search completed before or after the memory test) and singleton distractor
type (no singleton, unrelated singleton, or identical singleton) in Experi-
ment 5.
Table 4
Error Percentages in the Search and Memory Tasks of
Experiment 5
Task (order)
Singleton distractor type
None Unrelated Same
Search (search before memory) 3.1 3.8 3.6
Search (search after memory) 3.9 4.2 4.9
Memory (search before memory) 46.6 51.0 48.5
Memory (search after memory) 38.8 41.3 40.8
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more attention, and therefore resulted in stronger visual priming (if
we assume that priming strength depends on attention). Experi-
ment 5 already provided results that go against this argument. It
showed that content-related effects occurred only when the item
was still actively maintained, suggesting that it is not some pas-
sive, lower level visual process. In the present experiment, priming
was further controlled for in that both the relevant and the irrele-
vant color initially had to be equally attended (because at the time
of presentation it was not yet known which was which). Thus, on
the basis of the attention-modulated priming hypothesis, equal
effects are expected for singleton distractors regardless of whether
they are related to the relevant or to the irrelevant color.
The third purpose of Experiment 6 was to again control for the
possibility that observers use the singleton distractor in the search
display as an aid in the memory task (i.e., they deliberately attend
to the singleton to refresh their memory). As in Experiment 4, the
singleton distractor was never identical to the memorized item; it
could only be related in color.
Method
Participants. Forty-one students participated in exchange for monetary
compensation of €7 (approximately $9.00) per hour. They were 18 to 35
years old (M  22.2), and they reported normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. Three participants were dropped from the analyses. Two of these
had performed virtually at chance level in the memory task ( 20%
correct; one of them also made more than 32% search errors), and the third
produced average RTs of over 2,000 ms in all cells. Their removal left 38
participants in total.
Stimuli, apparatus, procedure, and design. The method was again the
same as in the previous experiments, with the following changes. Each trial
started with the successive presentation of two colored disks (instead of one),
which were presented in the center of the display for 1,500 ms each with an
interval of 1,000 ms in between. The participants were instructed to remember
the colors of both disks. When the disks had disappeared, after 1,500 ms a gray
cue (x  .30, y  .31; 13 cd/m2 and height 0.19o) appeared for 1,500 ms,
indicating the to-be-memorized item (1 for the first color, 2 for the second
color, randomly determined).3 Consequently the indicated color became rel-
evant whereas the other color became irrelevant for the memory task. After a
1,000-ms blank screen, the visual search display appeared, always containing
a color-defined singleton distractor, which could be related to the relevant
color, related to the irrelevant color, or unrelated to either. (It was still always
irrelevant to the search task.) To avoid the possibility that the participant would
attend to the singleton distractor item to aid in the memory task, the singleton
was made related in color but never identical. At the memory test at the end of
the trial, six disks (instead of three) were presented in two rows centered on the
screen. The related singleton distractor could, at chance level, return as a foil
in the memory test. One row showed three alternatives of the relevant color
category (including the exact to-be-memorized color); the other row showed
three alternatives of the irrelevant color category (including the exact to-be-
ignored color). The participant had to decide which color was the to-be-
memorized one and responded with the ring, middle, and index fingers of the
right hand by pressing one of the keys 1 to 6 on the numeric keypad. There
were four blocks of 48 trials each, containing 12 related to relevant, 12 related
to irrelevant, and 24 unrelated trials each, randomly mixed, resulting in a total
of 48 trials per singleton distractor type in total (96 for the unrelated condition).
Participants received 24 practice trials before the experiment started.
Results and Discussion
The data were analyzed with singleton distractor type (unre-
lated, related to relevant, related to irrelevant) as a single factor.
On average, 4.0% errors were made in the search task, with no
significant differences between the different types of singleton
distractor (3.9%, 3.9%, and 4.4% for unrelated, related to irrele-
vant, and related to relevant singletons, respectively; Fs  1, ns).
In the memory task, 48.7% errors were made, again without
significant differences between conditions (47.6%, 48.5%, and
50.0% for unrelated, related to irrelevant, and related to relevant
singletons, respectively; F  1.9, ns). These included 5.4% (of the
total number of trials) on which the irrelevant color category was
chosen (of which 5.8% were in the related to irrelevant condition,
4.8% were in the related to relevant condition, and 5.5% were in
the unrelated condition; again, a nonsignificant difference, F 
1.44, ns). Furthermore, there was no sign of an active bias against
memory test alternatives that coincidentally matched the related
singleton distractors. Matching probes were selected on average on
11% of the trials, which is exactly the expected value if there is no
bias whatsoever (see Experiment 4 for further details).
The analyses of RTs revealed a significant main effect of
singleton distractor type, F(2, 74)  6.28, MSE  1,557.58, p 
.01. The direction of this effect is revealed in Figure 12. Partici-
pants tended to respond slowest in the related to the relevant color
condition (981 ms), followed by the unrelated condition (959 ms)
and the related to the irrelevant color condition (950 ms). Addi-
tional pairwise comparisons showed that the difference between
the related to relevant and the unrelated conditions was significant
(981 vs. 959 ms), t(37)  2.77, p  .01, as was the difference
between the related to relevant and the related to irrelevant con-
ditions (981 vs. 950 ms), t(31)  3.07, p  .01. The related to
irrelevant and unrelated conditions were not significantly different
(950 vs. 959; t  1, ns).
The results again revealed memory-driven attentional capture on
the basis of the contents of working memory. Singleton distractors
related to the memory content were more disruptive than unrelated
distractors. No such increased distractor effect was found for
singletons related to the irrelevant item—that is, the item that had
initially been attended and remembered but could subsequently be
ignored. Like Experiment 5, then, this experiment shows that
memory-driven attentional capture occurs only when the item is
indeed actively maintained in memory. The experiment provides
another argument against an explanation in terms of attention-
modulated priming. Because initially both the relevant and the
irrelevant color had to be remembered, the amount of attention
paid to each should have been equal. Yet they resulted in quite
different distractor effects. The results also once more argue
3 After 20 participants, it turned out that the cue was not generated
completely randomly owing to a programming error. In the related to the
relevant color condition the cue always indicated the first colored disk as
the to-be-memorized item. In the related to the irrelevant color and the
unrelated conditions the cue always indicated the second disk as the
to-be-memorized item. At debriefing, participants did not indicate having
noticed any abnormalities. The fact that trial types were randomized also
makes it unlikely that participants noticed the relationship. Note that
because the cue and singleton always came after the to-be-memorized
items, they had no predictive value for the memory task. After having
restored the error, we determined that there was no difference in the pattern
of results between the participants who received a randomly generated cue
and those who did not. We therefore pooled the data together to create
maximum statistical power.
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against the singleton being used as a deliberate memory aid. Here
the singleton color was never identical to the to-be-memorized
item, and attending to it should, if anything, only have harmed
memory performance.
There was no real sign of active suppression of the irrelevant
memory item. Our original hypothesis was that in order to prevent
the irrelevant color from interfering with the memory for the
relevant color, the irrelevant color might have to be inhibited. We
speculated that such inhibition might then carry over to the search
display, resulting in reduced interference from a related singleton.
However, the singleton related to the irrelevant color was just as
disruptive as the unrelated singleton.
Experiment 7: Attentional Capture or Delayed
Disengagement? An Eye Movement Study
So far, we have interpreted the memory-related effects as evi-
dence for stronger attentional capture on the basis of memory
content. However, at this stage we are still agnostic as to what
exactly this “stronger attentional capture” means. One possibility
is that observers direct their attention to the related singleton more
often than to the unrelated singleton. Stronger capture would thus
be equivalent to more frequent attentional engagement. The second
possibility is that observers do not attend to the related singleton
more frequently but that when they do attend to it they have more
trouble moving their attention away. In this case, stronger capture
would be equivalent to delayed attentional disengagement, or
increased attentional dwell time (Posner, Walker, Friedrich, &
Rafal, 1984; see also Theeuwes, Atchley, & Kramer, 1998). Of
course, a combination of these processes is also possible. Some
evidence for the first option (more frequent engagement) comes
from Soto et al. (2005; see also Moores et al., 2003), who found
that the first saccade was more often made to a memory-related
object than to an unrelated object. They concluded that the
memory-based guidance of attention occurs rather early, that is,
shortly after the onset of the display. Soto et al. did not look at the
second possibility, namely, that attention may dwell on memorized
objects for longer than on unrelated objects.
To assess whether the memory-based interference effects found
in the present study were due to more frequent engagement,
delayed disengagement, or both, we compared eye movement
behavior in a condition in which the singleton distractor was
related to the content of memory with behavior in a condition in
which the singleton was unrelated. If memory-related singletons
result in more frequent capture, then we should see more eye
movements directed toward the singleton distractor than in the
unrelated condition. If related singletons are more difficult to
disengage from, then we should find longer fixation times on
related than on unrelated singletons.
Method
Participants. Thirteen students participated in exchange for monetary
compensation of €7 (approximately $9.00) per hour. They were 18 to 34
years old (M  21.9), and they reported normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. One participant was removed from the analyses because her eye
movement pattern showed extremely slow and serial search, as she was
inspecting the search items one by one.
Stimuli, apparatus, procedure, and design. The method was again the
same as in the previous experiments, except that there were now only two
conditions. A singleton distractor was always present, and it could either be
related or unrelated to the memory item (which was a single item). The
singleton distractor was never the same as the memory item, but it could
return (at random) as one of the alternatives in the memory probe. The
singleton distractor never appeared in the position next to the target. As
before, the visual search set size was nine items in total. Apart from RTs
and response accuracy, eye movements were measured during the search
displays, using a 500-Hz EyeLink II infrared head-mounted eye tracker
(SR Research Ltd., Mississauga, Ontario, Canada; claimed spatial resolu-
tion 0.01°), in combination with a chin rest. To make sure that participants
really had to make an eye movement to the target, the M or N printed inside
it was reduced from 0.32° to 0.19°. Participants performed 16 blocks of 16
trials each (8 related and 8 unrelated, randomly mixed) with breaks in between.
These breaks were also used to recalibrate the eye tracker. The experimental
session was preceded by a 16-trial practice session without eye tracking.
Results and Discussion
The data were analyzed with singleton distractor type (unre-
lated, related) as a single factor.
Response data. On average, 3.5% errors were made in the
search task, in both the unrelated and related singleton condition
(no significant difference, t  0.1). In the memory task, error rates
across the two conditions were also identical, at 37% (no signifi-
cant difference, t  0.25). Furthermore, there was again no sign of
a bias against related singletons at the memory test: Matching
probes were selected on average on 14.1% of the trials, which is
slightly but not significantly ( p  .17) more than the expected
value of 11.1% (on the basis of nine possible color alternatives; see
also Experiment 4). The RTs for correct responses were analyzed
for valid eye movement trials only (discussed below), but the
results also held when invalid eye movement trials were included.
The RT data are shown in Figure 13A. RTs were 32 ms slower
when the singleton distractor was related (1,003 ms) than when it
was unrelated (971 ms), t(11)  3.52, p  .01.
Eye movement data. Eye movement samples were parsed into
saccades and fixations using EyeLink II’s standard parser config-
uration, with thresholds set at 30°/s for saccade velocity, 8,000°/s2
Figure 12. Mean reaction time results as a function of singleton distractor
type (related to the irrelevant memory item, related to the relevant memory
item, or unrelated) in Experiment 6. **p  .01.
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for saccade acceleration, and a minimum of 0.1° initial displace-
ment. Fixations were then classified as initial fixation (the very
first fixation, falling within approximately 4° from the center of the
display),4 on target (the first fixation that was not the initial
fixation and that fell on or within one item from the target), toward
the singleton distractor (any fixation that was not the initial
fixation and that fell within a “pie slice” of 40° to either side of the
straight line from the center of the display toward the singleton), or
other fixations (fixations on or toward items other than the target
or singleton distractor that occurred before the target fixation).
Trials on which no proper initial or target fixations were made or
on which eye movement data were (partly) lost owing to blinks or
technical problems were marked as invalid. In total, 5.35% of the
trials were lost this way, with no difference between related and
unrelated singleton conditions (5.3% and 5.4%, respectively). An
example trial is shown in Figure 14.
The most important eye movement results are summarized in
Figure 13B, 13C, and 13D. On average, the latency of the first
saccade (as indicated by the initial fixation duration after display
onset; Figure 13B) was 186 ms in the related condition and 193 ms
in the unrelated condition—a difference that was small (7 ms) but
significant, t(11) 3.67, p .01. In other words, at the start of the
search, the eyes left the initial fixation spot a little sooner when
there was a related singleton compared with when there was an
unrelated singleton. In contrast, on average the eyes were some-
what slower to arrive at the target when the singleton was related
(460 ms) than when it was not (439 ms; a significant difference of
21 ms), t(11)  3.01, p  .01. The most important result was that
in the related singleton condition, on a larger proportion of the
trials an eye movement was made in the direction of the singleton
distractor than in the unrelated singleton condition (63% vs. 48%,
respectively), t(11)  5.44, p  .001 (Figure 13C). On about 22%
of the trials, other types of eye movements were made (not directed
toward target or singleton distractor), with no significant differ-
ence between related and unrelated singleton conditions (21% and
23%, respectively; t  1.5, ns).
We then analyzed the data separately for trials on which capture
did and did not occur. On average, manual response times were
slower (1,060 ms) when the eyes were captured by the singleton as
4 Participants occasionally failed to fixate on the exact center of the
display at the start of the trial. However, the pattern of results did not
deviate for these trials, and we decided to regard these trials as valid as long
as the initial fixation fell inside the empty inner area of the search display
and did not fall within the target or singleton distractor areas.
Figure 13. The most relevant data of Experiment 7, as a function of singleton distractor type (unrelated or
related). Panel A shows the average manual reaction times (RTs). Panel B shows the average saccadic latency
for the first saccade. Panel C shows the proportion of trials on which the eyes went in the direction of the
singleton distractor (before going to the target). Panel D shows the average fixation duration on the singleton
distractor only for those trials on which attention was captured by it. **p  .01. ***p  .001.
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compared with when they were not captured (900 ms), t(11) 
7.38, p  .001. Initial fixation durations (i.e., saccadic latencies)
were shorter when the eyes were captured (177 ms) than when they
were not (197 ms), but this effect failed to reach significance,
despite 10 out of 12 participants showing it to a smaller or larger
extent, t(11)  1.64, p  .126. However, eye movements did
arrive significantly later at the target after capture as compared
with when no capture occurred (511 ms vs. 374 ms), t(11)  7.38,
p  .001. On trials on which the eyes were directed toward the
singleton distractor, the only difference was in the duration of the
initial fixation: The eyes left the initial fixation location after 174
ms after display onset when the singleton was related and after 180
ms when it was unrelated (a 6-ms difference), t(11)  3.79, p 
.01. The eyes also arrived 6 ms earlier at the related singleton
distractor (237 ms vs. 244 ms after display onset; not significant,
however: t  1.02). It is important to note that on these capture
trials, there were no significant differences in fixation duration on
the singleton itself, as related singletons were on average fixated
for 155 ms and unrelated singletons for 152 ms (Figure 13D).
Furthermore, on capture trials, arrival at the target was no later
when the singleton had been related (510 ms) than when it had
been unrelated (513 ms; t  1, ns). Finally, on capture trials,
manual RTs were not significantly slower when the singleton had
been related (1,067 ms) than when it had not (1,054 ms), t(11) 
1.34, p  .20.
The results are clear: Once more, manual RTs were found to be
slower when the singleton distractor was related to the contents of
working memory, demonstrating a memory-driven interference
effect. The eye movement data show that this slowing of RTs
occurred because related singletons captured attention on an in-
creased proportion of trials relative to unrelated singletons. Fur-
thermore, the saccadic latency for the initial saccade was slightly
but significantly speeded when the singleton was related, suggest-
ing that it more strongly attracted attentional orienting than an
unrelated singleton. The alternative hypothesis that the slowing of
RTs would be due to delayed disengagement from the related
singleton was not supported. When the eyes were captured, they
did not linger longer at related singletons than at unrelated single-
tons, and after singleton fixation, they did not take longer to move
toward the target. The results therefore point toward increased
frequency of engagement, and not delayed disengagement, as the
cause of the memory-driven interference.
Again, there was no sign of participants using the related sin-
gleton distractor in the search display as an aid to select against
response alternatives in the memory test. This conclusion was
further corroborated by the eye movement data: If observers had
deliberately studied the related singleton distractor to aid their
memory, then we would have expected longer fixation times on
related singletons than on unrelated singletons. This was not the
case.
It is interesting to compare the present study with a recent
patient study by Soto, Humphreys, and Heinke (2006a). They
compared patients with frontal lobe damage with age-matched
controls on a combined working-memory/visual-search task in
which the to-be-memorized item could return in the search display,
either on the target location (valid trials) or on a distractor location
(invalid trials). Relatively more saccades were directed to the
target on valid trials than on invalid trials, but this effect was the
same for the patients as for the controls, suggesting that the initial
capture effect was the same for the two groups. The main differ-
ence was on invalid trials, when the first fixation was not neces-
sarily made to the target. Under those conditions, the time to arrive
at the target was disproportionately high in the frontal patient
group as compared with the controls. This suggests that the pa-
tients may have had trouble disengaging from a distractor match-
ing the content of memory. As suggested by Soto et al., frontal
damage may lead to deficits in maintaining separate templates for
each of the tasks (i.e., the memory item and the search target).
Combining Soto et al.’s results (no effects on capture but effects on
disengagement) with ours (effects on capture but no effects on
disengagement) provides further support for the idea that atten-
tional engagement and disengagement processes can be dissoci-
ated (Posner et al., 1984).
Of further interest is the fact that the proportion of trials on
which the eyes were captured by the singleton was generally quite
high, at 48% even in the unrelated singleton condition. Compare
this with a very similar study by Theeuwes, De Vries, and Godijn
(2003, Experiment 2), in which participants were also asked to
search for a specific target shape and ignore a salient color sin-
gleton. Although Theeuwes et al. found signs of attentional capture
(i.e., increased manual RTs when a color singleton was present),
Figure 14. Example eye movement pattern from Experiment 7 (Partici-
pant 4, Block 1, Trial 18). The diamond was the target, and the bold disk
represents the uniquely colored distractor (which on this trial was related to
the memory content). The dashed lines represent the area within which an
eye movement was regarded as directed to the singleton distractor (if it was
not the initial fixation). The dashed and solid lines represent fixations and
eye movements, respectively, with larger circles representing longer fixa-
tion durations. The pair of numbers corresponds to the start time (relative
to the start of the trial) and duration of the fixation. On this trial the eyes
left central fixation after 160 ms (“first saccade latency”), arrived at the
singleton distractor 200 ms after display onset, remained fixated on the
singleton for another 252 ms, and then arrived at the target location at 496
ms after display onset. The manual reaction time on this trial was 977 ms.
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the singleton distractor hardly ever captured the eyes (only 1.5% of
the trials; see also Wu & Remington, 2003). We believe the crucial
difference lies in the additional working memory load in the
present experiment. In line with previous findings (Lavie & De
Fockert, 2005), we speculate that the increased working memory
requirements make it more difficult to maintain goal-directed
control of attention, resulting in stronger interference from task-
irrelevant distractors and therefore more frequent oculomotor cap-
ture. Indeed, Experiment 1 provided direct evidence for this by
showing increased singleton distractor costs under dual task
conditions.
General Discussion
The reported experiments demonstrate the following:
1. Working memory load leads to overall increased inter-
ference from singleton distractors in a visual search task
(Experiment 1).
2. Visual working memory and visual attention share rep-
resentations of task-relevant stimuli, as interference is
further increased when the distractor matches the content
of working memory (Experiments 2–7).
3. However, content-specific interference occurs only when
observers are discouraged from using verbal codes and
forced to use a (presumably) more visual kind of memory
(Experiments 1–3).
4. Just like visual attention, visual working memory can
prioritize one feature over the other (Experiment 4).
5. Only those items that are actively maintained in memory
drive visual attention. Items that are no longer relevant
can be selectively dropped from memory and do not
result in increased interference (while relevant items are
maintained; Experiments 5 and 6).
6. Increased interference effects occur because attention
(and the eyes) goes to the memory-related distractor more
often, not because attention dwells on it for longer (Ex-
periment 7).
The present study corroborates and extends earlier findings,
while controlling for factors such as low-level perceptual priming
by the matching item, the absence of penalties associated with
attending to the memorized item, confounding attentional sets for
the memorized property, and strategic use of the item in the
attention task to improve performance on the memory task, by (a)
always making the singleton distractor irrelevant, and in fact
harmful, to the task, so that costs would be due to automatic
attentional capture and not to implicit or explicit attentional sets
(Experiments 1–7); (b) including conditions that controlled for
priming, such as the no-memory condition of Experiment 1, the
verbal memory conditions of Experiments 2 and 3, the reversed
task order of Experiment 5, and the irrelevant but attended color of
Experiment 6; (c) including singleton distractors that were related
but not identical to the memorized item, so that attending to the
singleton distractor was of no use for the memory task (Experi-
ments 4, 6, and 7). Taken together, our results provide evidence for
content-based, memory-driven attentional capture, as predicted by
the shared representation hypothesis.
Working Memory  Attention?
Our study appears to further fuel the idea that attention and
visual working memory should, in essence, be regarded as one and
the same concept. They appear to share not only representations
(i.e., content) but also the same maximum capacity, the same
resources, and the same control processes. In terms of capacity, it
has been proposed that observers can typically attend to, track, tag,
enumerate, and retain a maximum of around four items simulta-
neously in both attention and working memory tasks (Alvarez &
Cavanagh, 2004; Burkell & Pylyshyn, 1997; Cowan, 2000; Luck
& Vogel, 1997; Mandler & Shebo, 1982; Pashler, 1988b; Phillips,
1974; Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988; Sperling, 1960; Trick & Pylyshyn,
1994; Yantis & Johnson, 1990). If they share the same capacity,
then filling working memory to the brim should affect attention.
To test this, Woodman, Vogel, and Luck (2001) assessed visual
search performance when observers had to simultaneously remem-
ber a set of up to four objects. They found an overall effect on
search RTs, regardless of the number of to-be-searched items.
Note, however, that this overall effect is somewhat difficult to
explain from a shared capacity perspective, because if memory
load results in reduced search capacity, one would expect an
increase in search slope rather than just in the intercept. In a
follow-up study, Woodman and Luck (2004) found such slope
effects when observers were given a spatial memory task instead
of an object memory task. Woodman and Luck interpreted this as
a content-specific effect: Because visual search is a spatial process,
it is affected only by spatial memory. This may be the case, but the
alternative explanation is that the spatial memory task was more
taxing on general control processes than the object memory task,
therefore leaving fewer resources to reject the distractors.
The case for shared resources and control mechanisms is further
boosted by the earlier mentioned study by Lavie and De Fockert
(2005), demonstrating increased visual distractor interference un-
der conditions of high memory load. It suggests that the mainte-
nance of working memory demands resources or control mecha-
nisms that are otherwise used to bar irrelevant visual information.
This result was replicated here in Experiment 1. However, note
that this general load effect presents somewhat of a puzzle with
regard to our findings in Experiments 2 to 7. There we found
increased interference for memory-related singleton distractors in
the more visual memory conditions relative to the more verbal
memory conditions. However, note that the visual memory con-
ditions were also overall more difficult, as participants made
substantially more errors on the visual memory test than on the
verbal memory test. We may assume that visual memory load was
therefore generally higher than verbal memory load. Yet this did
not lead to overall stronger distractor interference in the more
visual conditions (i.e., also for unrelated distractors), as would be
expected on the basis of the general load effect. We believe the
answer lies in another series of experiments by Lavie et al. (2004;
especially their Experiments 4 and 5) showing that it is not so
much (or not only) the amount of memory load that causes in-
creased interference but the fact that the observer needs to main-
tain and coordinate two task sets (i.e., dual task coordination load).
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In our experiments the bulk of the increased interference may be
due to the fact that participants need to coordinate a search task as
well as a memory task, regardless of whether the latter was verbal
or visual in nature. Important in this respect is that Lavie et al.
(2004; Experiment 5) showed that these dual task coordination
costs remain the same regardless of whether the secondary task has
a high or low load. Furthermore, they found that the same dual task
costs occurred even when one task could be finished before the
other. This is important in relation to our Experiment 5, where we
found no overall difference in capture whether the memory task
was completed before or after the search task (there were only
content-based effects). Apparently, just having to coordinate two
tasks puts a strain on visual attentional control processes, regard-
less of whether these tasks are high or low in memory load and
regardless of whether they overlap.
Another series of studies suggesting shared control mechanisms
has looked at the process of maintenance in visuospatial working
memory (see Awh & Jonides, 2001, for a review). The idea is that
the retention of information occurs through attention-based re-
hearsal (Smyth & Scholey, 1994). For instance, a series of loca-
tions is being remembered by continuously or repeatedly attending
to those locations. In support of this idea, Awh and colleagues
found that probes presented during the retention interval were
better perceived, and resulted in stronger fMRI and event-related
potential signals, when occurring at remembered locations as com-
pared with irrelevant locations (Awh & Jonides, 2000; Awh,
Jonides, & Reuter-Lorenz, 1998; Awh et al., 1999). Recently,
Theeuwes, Olivers, and Chizk (2005) showed that remembering a
location affects not only attention but also the oculomotor system,
as eye movement trajectories curved away from the memorized
location. Furthermore, Awh et al. (1998) found that spatial mem-
ory was impaired when observers were given a spatial attention
task during the retention interval but not when they were given a
nonspatial attention task. This latter finding indicates that not only
does the content of working memory affect attention, but the
reverse case—attention affecting working memory content—also
holds. In the present experiments there were some hints of the
singleton distractor influencing memory performance (notably in
Experiment 4; see also Schmidt, Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2002).
Working Memory Versus Attentional Set
In the introduction we argued that the interference caused by
irrelevant singletons reflects involuntary, automatic capture. In the
past, such automatic capture effects have been interpreted as
evidence for pure bottom-up processing (Theeuwes, 1991, 1992).
The fact that in the present study the interference was modulated
by working memory content indicates that there is some cognitive
penetrability to singleton capture. The effects are reminiscent of
the contingent attentional capture by certain features when observ-
ers actually adopt an attentional set for that feature (Folk et al.,
1992) and what has been termed conditional automaticity by
Bargh (1992). They clearly suggest top-down influences. Never-
theless, the bulk of the attentional capture effect in our study was
still blind to working memory content, and the safest conclusion is
probably that both bottom-up and top-down mechanisms affect
attentional priority.
Note that we do not want to suggest that the concepts of working
memory and attentional set should be treated as one and the same.
Although the merging of attention and working memory into a
single model sounds attractive to us, we do have reservations. First
of all, note that the content-related effects reported here, although
reliable and replicable, were relatively small (around 30 to 40 ms).
Other studies even failed to find a content-related effect of work-
ing memory on attention (Downing & Dodds, 2004; Woodman &
Luck, in press; Woodman et al., 2001). This appears to stand in
contrast to the rather strong attentional engagement effects found
when observers are actually looking for a related object, rather
than just remembering it. For instance, Folk, Leber, and Egeth
(2002) found that when their participants were looking for a target
presented at fixation, the appearance of peripheral distractors that
matched the target-defining property caused a drop in accuracy of
between 30% and 40%, suggesting that attention was captured on
at least those proportions of trials. Similarly strong contingent
capture effects have been found on RTs (Folk et al., 1992). Others
have suggested that once engaged onto a related object, attention
may dwell on it for periods of 200 to 300 ms or longer despite the
presentation of subsequent targets (Duncan, Ward, & Shapiro,
1994; Ward, 2001). If both memorizing and looking out for an
object involve attending to an internal representation of that ob-
ject—as is implicitly or explicitly assumed in various attention
theories—then what makes the one more effective than the other in
driving attention?
There could be several reasons. A rather mundane one is that our
tests were simply not sensitive enough to yield strong effects.
Participants may have attempted to use verbal codes even in the
conditions we assumed to be more visual. This may also partly
explain why others failed to find effects at all. For example,
Woodman and colleagues used an articulatory suppression task to
prevent verbal coding (Woodman & Luck, in press; Woodman et
al., 2001), but even this method may not be watertight, allowing
for relatively simple color names to be accessed. A second possi-
bility is that the bulk of the singleton distractor interference is
caused by the more general load effect, as is suggested by Exper-
iment 1. This may leave little room for additional content-specific
effects (i.e., interference is already at ceiling). Indeed, relative to
the no singleton distractor conditions, the content-related distractor
resulted in costs in the order of 120 to 150 ms, which comes closer
to the attentional dwell time effects estimated in other studies.
However, we cannot exclude a more fundamental reason for
why pure memory-based attentional capture may be relatively rare
or weak. Here we return to the point we alluded to in the intro-
duction: Working memory and attentional set are not necessarily
one and the same thing (see Downing & Dodds, 2004, and Wood-
man & Luck, in press, for similar arguments). Traditionally, work-
ing memory and attention have been regarded as two different
constructs, one selecting relevant information (i.e., perception) and
the other remembering relevant information (i.e., memory). To be
able to answer the question of whether these constructs should be
better treated as one and the same, one needs to at least give them
the chance to behave as two different constructs. In other words,
one needs to devise two different tasks: one typical memory task
(“now remember this green thing here”) and one typical attention
task (“now look for a diamond there”). If we then still find
interference between the two tasks, then we can conclude that our
constructs should perhaps not be so separate. In typical attentional
set studies, however, the to-be-memorized and to-be-looked for
stimulus are one and the same.
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A study by Chelazzi, Miller, Duncan, and Desimone (1993) may
be illustrative here. In this study, trained monkeys were first
presented with a single object, which they were required to re-
member. The initial object disappeared and, after about 3 s, was
followed by the presentation of a search display containing mul-
tiple objects, one of which could be the same as the remembered
object. The monkey’s task was to make an eye movement to the
matching object. Cells in the inferior temporal cortex that were
sensitive to the target object’s properties revealed relative in-
creases in activity to the presentation of the target in both the initial
memory display and the subsequent selection display. Important
here, though, is that the same cells also responded with increased
activity during the interval between the memory and the selection
display, which likely reflected the maintenance of a target repre-
sentation until the selection task was finished. This finding has
often been taken as evidence for the involvement of working
memory in maintaining a target-defining template for selection
(e.g., Chelazzi et al., 1993; Desimone & Duncan, 1995). We agree
that this task involves a good deal of working memory and that
target activity in the absence of the actual stimulus indeed provides
evidence for this. However, this does not mean that the activity in
these cells in particular directly reflects working memory per se.
Note that not only was the monkey required to remember the
object, it was also required to almost immediately apply the same
information to a visual selection task. This means that on top of a
memory representation, the monkey may have formed an atten-
tional set for the appearance of the same object. Such an additional
attentional representation is what may have been measured by
Chelazzi and colleagues. If the memorized item had been neces-
sary for some purpose other than an immediately following exter-
nal visual task (e.g., for internal use or later use), activity in some
cells may have been absent or reduced. Our point is that attentional
sets may require working memory but that the reverse case is not
incontrovertibly true: Working memory does not necessarily result
in an attentional set for stimuli for the outside world.
The consequence may have been that in our experiments, the
memory and visual search tasks were relatively shielded from each
other (Downing & Dodds, 2004). Memory representations may
have been protected while the search task received priority, and
vice versa (although the fact that the search target always remained
the same probably meant that the search task demanded little
working memory). Only when the stimulus becomes directly rel-
evant to the task will the additional level of attentional priority be
switched on. Under certain circumstances, the memorized item
may even be visually suppressed, leading to less rather than more
interference in the visual task (Woodman & Luck, in press). Future
research will need to address when memorized items are priori-
tized (as in the present case) and when they can be actively
deprioritized (as in Woodman & Luck’s case). The point here is
that working memory and attention share visual representations (as
shown by both the present study and Woodman & Luck’s study)
but that this does not necessarily mean that priorities are also
shared.
Of course, one might argue that the managing of such task
priorities should be regarded as an integral part of working mem-
ory (Baddeley, 2003; Lavie, 2000). One might even argue that
there is no such thing as “pure” working memory, in that a
memorized item that is not immediately relevant to the task at hand
is by definition not represented in working memory but perhaps
either stored in long-term memory or merely lingering as fleeting
activation (cf. Potter, 1993). We suspect that in the end, whether or
not we will regard working memory and attention as one and the
same will depend on such issues of definition. Whether they
should be regarded as separate constructs or not, from the present
work we can at least conclude that at some level they make use of
the same visual representations.
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